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published in the Federal Register on December 29, 1994.
See also Ltr. Rul. 9452024, Sept. 29, 1994 (income
allocated to each LLC member is included in that
member's self-employment income when the member
"engage[s] in the daily activities [of the firm] and will
perform substantial services...").
10 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 I.R.C. § 464. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.464-2(a)(1).
15 I.R.C. § 464. See N. Harl, "Limited Liability
Companies: Eligibility for Cash Accounting," 4 Agric. L.
Dig. 109 (1993). See Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
7.04 [2][c][i][A](1995).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION. When the plaintiffs purchased their
property neighboring the defendant's, a fence existed on
their property 30 feet on to the plaintiffs' property. The
plaintiffs testified that when the property was purchased, the
disputed strip was considered to be part of the plaintiffs'
property; however, the plaintiffs did not attempt to have the
fence moved and did not have a survey performed until
eight years after the purchase. The defendant claimed title
to the disputed land by over 30 years adverse possession.
The defendant had farmed as close to the fence as possible,
grazed cattle on the property, maintained a hog pen on the
property and hunted on the property. The defendant and
predecessor in title had helped maintain the fence and the
defendant had grazed some cattle, hunted and rode horses
on the disputed property. The court held that although the
plaintiffs demonstrated some use of the disputed property
during the 30 years, the trial court's ruling that the defendant
had adversely possessed the disputed strip was not clearly
wrong and was entitled to be affirmed. Soileau v. Matte,
647 So.2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL . After the debtors failed to obtain a
modification of their Chapter 12 plan, the debtors filed to
dismiss their case. A creditor, however, moved to convert
the case to Chapter 7 because of fraud committed by the
debtor during the bankruptcy case. The debtors argued that
Section 1208(b) provided a mandatory dismissal of the case
upon the debtors' request. The bank argued that Section
1208(d) took precedence if fraud by the debtor was shown.
The court held that Section 1208(b) had precedence but
ordered the dismissal to be held in abeyance in order for the
creditor to prove the alleged fraud and for the court to order
sanctions against the debtors before granting the dismissal.
In re Davenport, 175 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1994).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtor formed a partnership with
another person to operate a farm which bred and raised
American Alpine show goats. The partnership agreement
provided for a $15,000 annual guaranteed payment to the
debtor for managing the operation. The debtor also worked
part-time as a liquor store sales clerk. For the taxable year
preceding the Chapter 12 bankruptcy petition, the debtor's
income tax returns showed $15,000 in income from the
partnership and $13,500 as the debtor's share of partnership
losses. The partnership had total losses of $38,000 for that
year and the other partner contributed $36,000 to help cover
those losses. A creditor argued that the other partner's
contribution was a gift to the debtor and not farm income;
therefore, the debtor's nonfarm income exceeded farm
income and the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12. The
court held that the debtor did perform management and
breeding services for the partnership business and the
partnership guaranteed payments were bona fide payments
for services rendered; therefore, the guaranteed payments
were farm income for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility. In
re Pierce, 175 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISMISSAL. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 in July
1994 because the debtors were ineligible for Chapter 13
because of too much debt. After the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994 was passed which increased the debt amount
for Chapter 13 filers, the debtors filed for conversion of
their case or dismissal in order to refile under Chapter 13.
The court held that the Act specifically prohibited
retroactive application of the eligibility requirements and
held that dismissal would not be allowed because refiling
would give the debtors an advantage over the only creditor
in the case. In re Fitzpatrick, 175 B.R. 436 (Bankr. D.
N.H. 1994).
    FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ABANDONMENT. The Chapter 7 debtor's creditors
held claims secured by most of the debtor's farm property.
The debtor and one of the secured creditors agreed to give
the creditor relief from the automatic stay to sell livestock
subject to a quarantine and the animals were sold with the
proceeds applied to the secured claim. The trustee filed a
Report of No Distribution and Notice of Intended
Abandonment (the Notice) but did not obtain an
abandonment order. With the consent of the trustee, the
secured creditors obtained additional relief from the
automatic stay to sell crops and machinery collateral for
their claims. The crops were sold prior to the discharge of
the debtor but the machinery was not sold until after the
discharge. The agreement for the relief from the automatic
stay contained a provision that any proceeds from the sales
in excess of the claim were to be paid to the trustee. After
the case was closed, the IRS sought payment from the
debtor of taxes incurred by the gain on the sales of the
animals, crops and machinery. The trustee argued that the
assets were either abandoned by reason of the Notice or by
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the effect of the orders for a relief from the automatic stay.
The debtor claimed that the sales were made as part of the
estate administration and were the liability of the estate. The
court held that the Notice was insufficient to act as a motion
to abandon property under Section 544(a), (h) because the
Notice did not identify the proper dates for objecting to the
Notice, the trustee had not yet examined the debtor when
the Notice was filed, and the property subject to
abandonment was not identified until one month after the
Notice was filed. The court also discussed possible
abandonment under Section 544(c). The court ruled that
abandonment under Section 544(c) occurred only as to
property not administered in the case, a event which did not
occur until the case was closed. The court held that
abandonment did not occur under Section 544(c) because
all but the last asset sale occurred prior to the closing of the
case. Even though the last sale occurred after the closing of
the case, the sale occurred under the agreement for relief
from the automatic stay and contained the provision for
excess proceeds to be paid to the trustee; therefore, the
trustee retained an interest in the sale and could not claim
abandonment of property in which the trustee retained an
interest. Therefore, the court held that all of the tax liability
from the sales of farm property was a liability of the estate.
Matter of Nebel, 175 B.R. 306 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994).
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 with a ranch as the only major piece of property.
The ranch was subject to a mortgage far in excess of the fair
market value of the ranch and the creditor filed for relief
from the automatic stay. The debtor objected to the motion
because the sale of the property would result in significant
tax liability to the debtor. The trustee reached an agreement
with the creditor and debtor for the sale of the property and
filed a motion for the sale of the property free of liens.
Notice of the trustee's motion was not given to the state and
federal tax authorities but the motion was approved by the
court. The property was sold and the creditor received the
fair market value of the property, the expenses of the sale
and taxes were paid and the trustee received a fee. The IRS
and state tax department did not receive notice of the sale
until the trustee presented estate tax returns to the court for
approval of a motion to determine the tax liability of the
estate. The trustee claimed that the estate had tax liability
from the sale but had no assets to pay the taxes. The court
held that payment of the trustee fee from the sale proceeds
was not authorized and ordered recovery of the fee for pro
rata distribution with the tax claims as administrative
expenses. The court held that the trustee fee was not a
reasonable expense of the sale of the property. In re
Goffena, 175 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
PRIORITY. The debtors had filed bankruptcy petitions
in 1991 and 1993 which were both dismissed. The debtors
refiled in 1994 and the IRS filed claims for taxes due for
1988 and after. The debtors argued that only the taxes due
since 1991, three years before the filing of the current
petition, were eligible for priority and were
nondischargeable. The IRS argued that the priority period
had to be determined as of the first filed petition. Although
the court argued that the plain language of the statutes
provided for priority of taxes due within three years before
the current petition, the court held that it was bound by stare
decisis to follow United States v. Richards, 994 F.2d 763
(10th Cir. 1993) and allow priority for taxes due within
three years of the first petition in 1991. In re Brown, 175
B.R. 764 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
issued proposed regulations adding the sugarcane
endorsement to the common crop insurance policy. 60 Fed.
Reg. 9629 (Feb. 21, 1995).
GRAIN INSPECTION. The Grain Inspection, Packers
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) has issued
proposed regulations amending the standards for corn to
report test weight to the nearest tenth of a pound, eliminate
the count limit on stones, and reduce the sample grade
aggregate weight tolerance to more than 0.1 percent. 60
Fed. Reg. 9790 (Feb. 22, 1995).
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS. Because of heavy rains
and floods, the plaintiffs were unable to timely plant their
1986 wheat crops. After receiving assurances from the
county and state committees that deficiency payments
would not be reduced because of late plantings, the
plaintiffs eventually planted their crops as late as March
1987 but were informed in late 1987 that they would
receive no deficiency payments for the plantings because
the crops were planted too late. The plaintiffs appealed the
adverse administrative appeal decisions, claiming that they
had no notice of the time restrictions on planting the 1987
crops, that the defendant was estopped from denying the
deficiency payments because the county committee
approved the late plantings, and the lower yields were
related to the flooding and not the late plantings. The trial
court held that the defendant had presented sufficient
evidence of timely notice to the plaintiffs to support the
administrative judgment for the defendant as to the notice
claim. The trial court also held that the defendant was not
estopped by the erroneous county committee decision
because the plaintiffs should have known that the late
plantings would result in lower payments. The trial court in
effect required producers to be as knowledgeable about
ASCS regulations and procedures, including ASCS
handbooks, as the ASCS. The trial court also upheld the
defendant’s determinations that the late plantings would
lower yields based on the information available to the
defendant. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
trial court improperly accepted as evidence general
statements in the administrative decisions and statements of
ASCS counsel. The appellate court held that the ASCS
failed to provide the plaintiffs with due process in the
administrative appeal hearings in refusing to allow
examination of ASCS employees and that the ASCS failed
to identify the specific factual findings on which the
administrative decisions were based. Olenhouse v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994),
rev'g, 807 F. Supp. 688 (D. Kan. 1992).
EXPORTS. The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
requiring export inspection facilities to have running water,
water drainage systems and telephones. Facilities where
horses are inspected are required to have walkways in front
of stalls and 12 foot high ceilings where the horses are
inspected. 60 Fed. Reg. 9609 (Feb. 21, 1995).
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HERBICIDES. The plaintiff alleged that a crop
herbicide manufactured by the defendant caused the
plaintiff to acquire non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. The petition
claimed negligence for failure to warn that the herbicide
could cause cancer and strict liability. However, the
plaintiff had no evidence of a manufacturing defect. The
court held that the negligence claims were based on failure
to warn and were preempted by FIFRA. The court also held
that the strict liability claim was also preempted by FIFRA
because the claim was based on a failure to warn and not a
manufacturing defect. Jenkins v. Amchem Products, Inc.,
886 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1994).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. In October
1994, the FSIS initiated a program of inspecting ground
beef for E. Coli bacteria under a new interpretation of E.
Coli meat as "adulterated" under the Federal Meat
Inspection Act (FMIA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). The
plaintiffs were supermarket and meat-industry associations
which sought an injunction against the sampling program
and the definition of E. Coli infected meat as adulterated.
The plaintiff argued that the new program violated the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) because the FSIS did
not provide notice and comment before instituting the
program. The FSIS argued that the program was an
interpretative rule excepted from the APA. The court held
that the sampling program itself was a procedural rule
excepted from the APA. The change in definition of E. Coli
meat as adulterated was held to be an interpretative rule
because the FMIA does not require the FSIS to engage in
substantive rulemaking in order to define a particular
substance as adulterated; therefore, the FSIS had the
discretion to consider individual cases as meeting the
definition of adulterated. The court also held that the new
definition was not arbitrary or capricious because the FSIS
produced sufficient evidence that E. Coli bacteria were
dangerous to people because most people did not cook their
ground beef sufficiently to destroy the E. Coli; therefore,
the new definition was required to further the FMIA policy
of protecting the public. Texas Food Industry Ass'n v.
Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].*  The first trust was established by the decedent's
parent and provided the decedent with a life income interest
in the trust with a remainder to the decedent's children. The
decedent established the second trust in 1938 with the
decedent as income beneficiary and with a remainder
interest to the same children.  At the decedent's death, four
children survived, two of who were alive when the trusts
were established and two who were born after the trusts
were established. The trustee of the two trusts petitioned the
state court to merge the two trusts and create four new
trusts, one for each beneficiary. Each beneficiary's share
was split into two parts with each part governed by the
provisions of one of the original trusts. No additions had
been made to the trusts after 1984 and each beneficiary's
share of the trusts remained the same after the merger and
division. The IRS ruled that no gain or loss would be
recognized by the merger and division of the trusts and the
trusts would not be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9505005,
Nov. 2, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The decedent had owned 60
percent of the stock of a corporation with the decedent's
three children owning the other 40 percent, child A owned
20 percent and children 2 and 3 owned 10 percent each. The
decedent was diagnosed with cancer. One month before the
decedent died, the cancer was found to be wide spread and
the decedent was placed on constant care and needed
constant oxygen. Child A was a physician and was involved
with the medical care of the decedent. Within one month of
the decedent's death, the decedent executed a stock sale
agreement which transferred half of the stock to child A in
exchange for a monthly annuity based upon the valuation
tables of Pub. 1456, Table S, using a six year life
expectancy for the 70 year old decedent. The decedent also
caused the corporation to redeem the remaining shares.
After the first transfer, child A had a 50 percent interest in
the corporation and after the redemption, child A had a 71.4
percent interest in the corporation, with the other children
each having a 14.3 percent interest. The estate discounted
the value of the shares transferred because each transfer was
of a minority interest. The IRS ruled that the value of the
transfer to child A could not be valued using the tables
because the decedent was clearly not expected to live more
than one year after the transfer. The IRS also ruled that the
transfer and redemption had to be considered as one
transaction because the purpose of both transactions was the
transfer of a controlling interest in the corporation to child
A. Ltr. Rul. 9504004, Oct. 20, 1994.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent had
established a trust with the decedent as primary income
beneficiary and trustee. The trust provided that the trustee
had the power to distribute trust corpus to the beneficiary
for the health, support, maintenance and education of the
beneficiary if the beneficiary had need for the money given
the beneficiary's other sources of income. The trust also
contained a spendthrift clause preventing attachment of a
beneficiary's interest and a provision authorizing the trustee
to withhold payments to the beneficiary and to make
payments directly to third parties for the benefit of the
beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the decedent did not retain a
general power of appointment over the trust corpus because
the distribution of trust corpus could be made only
according to an ascertainable standard. Ltr. Rul. 9504003,
Oct. 17, 1994.
VALUATION. The taxpayer established two grantor
annuity trusts, with each trust having one of the taxpayer's
children as remainder beneficiary. The trusts provided for
an annuity amount which was not sufficient to deplete the
trusts which terminated at the earlier of the taxpayer's death
or seven years. The annuity was to be paid first from trust
income, then from capital gains and trust principal. Excess
income was to be accumulated as principal. The trusts were
funded with S corporation stock.  The taxpayer retained the
power to substitute similar property for trust property. The
trusts provided for distribution of an amount equal to the
additional federal income taxes incurred by the debtor from
the trust arrangement. At the termination of the trusts, the
property passed to the child if living. If a remainder
beneficiary did not survive the trust, the trust property
passed to the other trust beneficiary if living or the issue of
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the beneficiary, in trust if the issue were less than 35 years
old. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was considered the
owner of the trusts and no gain or loss would be recognized
from transfer of the stock to the trusts. The IRS also ruled
that the trust were qualified annuity interests for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2702(b) such that the value of the gifts to the
remainder holders was equal to the difference in the fair
market value of the stock and the value of the taxpayer's
retained annuity interest. The IRS also ruled that the trusts
would be QSST so that transfer of the stock to the trusts did
not cause termination of the S corporation status. Ltr. Rul.
9504021, Oct. 28, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. Senator Byron L.
Dorgan of North Dakota has introduced S. 368 which would
exclude deferred payment grain contract income from
alternative minimum tax income. See Harl, "Deferred
Payment Sales: AMT Liability," 4 Agric. L. Digest 17
(1993).
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF TAX. The IRS has
adopted as final regulations setting an administrative fee of
$43 for entering into restructuring agreements for
installment payment of federal gift, estate and income taxes.
60 Fed. Reg. 8298 (Feb. 14, 1995).
INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].*  In the first hearing, the
court invalidated Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T as
overbroad because the regulation disallowed an interest
deduction for interest paid on underpayment of income tax
regardless of the source of the income. The holding
reinstated the previous rule that interest paid on income tax
deficiencies on trade or business income is deductible to the
extent the interest is characterized as as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. The court allowed the IRS time
to discover evidence on the issue of whether the interest
paid by the taxpayer relating to farm business income was
ordinary and necessary. In the second hearing, evidence was
presented by the IRS that the tax deficiency which gave rise
to the interest expense resulted from the taxpayer's attempts
to defer income by treating distributions from the taxpayer
farm corporation to the taxpayer as loans from the end of
the corporation tax year to the beginning of the taxpayer's
tax year. The court held that this scheme was not an
ordinary or necessary course of business; therefore, the
interest expense which arose from the tax deficiency was
not an ordinary and necessary business expense entitled to
an interest deduction. Miller v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,068 (D. N.D. 1994); 841 F. Supp. 305 (D.
N.D. 1993).
The taxpayers claimed a deduction of investment
interest for interest paid on a tax deficiency. The taxpayers
argued that the interest was related to taxes on income from
capital gains resulting from their business. The court held
that the interest expense was not a normal or usual incident
of their business because the interest resulted from the
taxpayers' late payment of the tax. Rose v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-75.
The IRS has announced new tables for computing
interest on over and under payments of tax using daily
compounding rules established under I.R.C. § 6622,
effective after December 31, 1994. Rev. Proc. 95-17,
I.R.B. 1995-9.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. This ruling involved one
of the taxpayer's tax years and several years prior to that
year, all of which occurred while the taxpayer was in
bankruptcy. The statute of limitations for refunds had
expired for all years except the last year. The taxpayer had
filed a timely income tax return for the last year which
included reduction of the NOLs by the amount of discharge
of indebtedness income from the bankruptcy; however, the
bankruptcy trustee amended the bankruptcy estate returns to
show less discharge of indebtedness income than had been
used by the taxpayer and the taxpayer sought permission to
increase the NOLs from the prior tax years to be carried
over to the last year. The IRS cited Rev. Rul. 56-285, 1956-
1 C.B. 134 for support for the rule that adjustments may be
made in closed tax years in order to determine a current
deduction in an open year. The IRS cited Rev. Rul. 81-88,
1981-1 C.B. 85, for support for applying this rule to
determining refunds in an open year by making adjustments
in closed years. The IRS reasoned that the refund statute of
limitation applied to the deduction available in the open
year and that adjustments in the previous closed years were
not barred by a statute of limitations since no refund was
claimed for the closed years. Ltr. Rul. 9504032, Oct. 31,
1994.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. After the
partner had resigned from the partnership, a tax matters
partner had signed a consent for extension of the period for
assessments against the partnership. The court held that the
consent was effective against the partnership because the
partner had not resigned as tax matters partner and the
partnership had not designated a new tax matters partner
prior to the signing of the consent. Monetary II Limited
Partnership v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,073 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1992-562.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INTEREST. The IRS has
announced that it will follow the rule of Allbritton v.
Comm'r, 37 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 1994); Flood v. Comm'r, 33
F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994); Sharp v. U.S., 14 F.3d 583 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) and Beyer v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1990) that taxpayers may carry over disallowed passive
investment interest in taxable years in which the interest
exceeds taxable income. Rev. Rul. 95-16, I.R.B. 1995-8, 4.
RETURNS. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
requires that taxpayer provide the taxpayer identification
number for all dependents, regardless of age. Pub. L. No.
103-465, Sec. 743 (1994).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX. The taxpayer operated a
trucking business which leased four trucks to another
trucking company and supplied the drivers for the trucks.
The taxpayer hired the drivers as independent contractors
and did not withhold or pay FICA or FUTA taxes for the
amounts paid to the drivers as compensation. The taxpayer
presented affidavits from the taxpayer and an accountant
that many other trucking firms treated their drivers as
independent contractors. The taxpayer argued that the
industry practice of treating drivers as independent
contractors was a reasonable basis for treating the taxpayer's
drivers as independent contractors for purposes of the "safe
harbor" provision of Section 530(a) of the Revenue Act of
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1978. The IRS presented an affidavit of another trucking
company which stated that it treated its drivers as
employees and it knew of many other companies which also
treated their drivers as employees. The court held that the
evidence was sufficient for the Bankruptcy Court to grant
summary judgment to the taxpayer. In re Bentley, 175 B.R.
652 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
TAX YEAR. A C corporation made an S corporation
election and sought permission from the regional service
center to change to a March 31 tax year, the tax year used
by the shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the
corporation. The service center returned the Form 1128
marked accepted and the corporation used the March 31 tax
year. However, the majority shareholder transferred all
stock to the other shareholder who had a December 31 tax
year. The corporation argued that it could retain the March
31 tax year under Section 5.01(2) of Rev. Proc. 87-32,
1987-2 C.B. 396 because of the prior approval by the
service center. The IRS ruled that the regional service
center approval of the March 31 tax year was not sufficient
to meet the requirements of Rev. Proc. 87-32, which
required approval by the national office. Because the
corporation was now solely owned by a taxpayer with a
December 31 tax year, the corporation either had to adopt
the December 31 tax year or receive permission to retain the
March 31 tax year. Ltr. Rul. 9505003, Oct. 14, 1994.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
110% AFR 7.93 7.78 7.71 7.66
120% AFR 8.66 8.48 8.39 8.33
Mid-term
AFR 7.75 7.61 7.54 7.49
110% AFR 8.55 8.37 8.28 8.23
120% AFR 9.34 9.13 9.03 8.96
Long-term
AFR 7.93 7.78 7.71 7.66
110% AFR 8.74 8.56 8.47 8.41
120% AFR 9.56 9.34 9.23 9.16
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CROPS. The debtor had granted to a bank a security
interest in all farm products. The financing statements
described several parcels of land on which the debtor grew
crops but did not include a description of land on which the
debtor grew waxy corn in 1990. The waxy corn was stored
in a grain elevator which eventually purchased the corn by
issuing a check to the debtor and another creditor. The bank
had notified the elevator of its security interest in the corn.
The elevator argued that the security interest was not
perfected because the financing statement did not contain a
description of the land on which the corn was grown as
required by Minn. Stat. §§ 336.9-203(1)(a), 9-402(1). The
court held that once the corn was harvested, the real estate
description provision was no longer necessary for a
perfected security interest; therefore, the elevator was liable
for conversion of the corn. The court also held that the bank
did not waive its security interest by not objecting to the
debtor's Chapter 12 plan because the conversion occurred
prior to the filing of the Chapter 12 case. Frost State Bank
v. Peavey Co., 524 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS. The debtors sold a
portion of their farm land to third parties on contract. The
contract reserved the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
payments to the debtors. The contract and the CRP payment
provision were assigned to the bank which held the
mortgage on the property. The assignment specifically
granted the bank the right to the CRP payments for payment
on the loan and granted the bank the right to the rents and
profits from the land if the CRP payments were not made.
The bank filed a financing statement for the assignments
with the county real estate records. The bankruptcy trustee
argued that the security interest in the CRP payments was
not perfected because the financing statement should have
been filed in the state Secretary of State's office since the
CRP payments were general intangibles. The court noted a
diversity of case precedent as to whether CRP payments
were general intangibles or rents but did not rule on that
issue. The state recording statute, N.D. Cent. Code § 41-09-
40, had been amended to allow the filing of financing
statements for CRP payment security interests in either the
local or state office and was effective retroactively to a
period before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Therefore, the court ruled that the financing statement was
perfected on the date of the bankruptcy petition and was not
avoidable by the trustee. The trustee also argued that the
security interest was not perfected because no security
agreement was signed by the parties. The court ruled that a
specific security agreement was not required and that the
assignment agreement was sufficient to function as a
security agreement because it was signed and contained
language granting the bank a security interest in the CRP
payments. In re Arithson, 175 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. N.D.
1994).
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a.* A bank had perfected a security interest in the
debtor's farm products, including hogs; however, in the
filing with the Secretary of State, the bank failed to supply
the Effective Financing Statement (EFS) code for hogs.  A
feed supplier had supplied hog feed on credit to the debtor
and called the Secretary of State's office to see if any
security interests were filed as to the hogs. The office
employee stated on the phone that no EFS code was
included for hogs; however, the supplier did not request a
full computer printout of the security interest filing. The
supplier then perfected a security interest in the hogs and
claimed a priority security interest in the proceeds of the
sale of the hogs for the supplied feed. The court held that
the failure of the bank to supply the EFS code for hogs was
not sufficient to make the security interest unperfected
because the supplier had the duty to inquire further and at
least obtain a computer printout of filed security interests
against the debtor's property. The court also held that the
supplier was not eligible for the good faith buyer exception
because the supplier did not purchase the hogs but was only
a competing lien holder. Farmers & Merchants State
Bank v. Tevedal, 524 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 1994).
The debtor had granted the plaintiff bank a security
interest in all cattle and offspring of the cattle. The loan
agreement provided that the debtor could not sell collateral
without prior written permission of the plaintiff. The
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plaintiff provided notice of the security interest to the
defendant stockyard and notified the defendant that
violation of the security agreement could be avoided if the
defendant issued checks for sale of the collateral to the
plaintiff and debtor jointly. The debtor sold cattle collateral
through the defendant but the defendant did not issue the
checks jointly to the debtor and plaintiff. However, the
debtor informed the plaintiff of the sales when the debtor
deposited some of the proceeds in the bank and paid on the
loan. The plaintiff never expressed any objection to the
sales and testified that such sales were part of the ordinary
business expected with debtors. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff had waived the security interest through its
course of conduct in allowing the sales without objection.
The plaintiff argued that the federal farm products rule
preempted state law governing waivers of security interests.
The court held that the federal farm products rule did not
preempt the state law of waiver because the rule did not
cover all aspects of secured transactions and specifically
authorized use of state law for some purposes of the rule.
Springfield Mercantile Bank v. Joplin Stockyards, 870
F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
STATE BOARDS. The Kansas State Board of
Agriculture (the Board) was elected by delegates of state
private agricultural associations at the Board's annual
meeting. The court found that the Board was a state agency
with general governmental powers because the Board’s
functions included such duties as the appointment of the
state Dairy Commissioner which affected all residents of
Kansas. The court held that the method of electing the
Board violated the “one person, one vote” principle of the
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and
permanently enjoined the election of another board until the
legislature enacted a constitutional method of election.
Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994),
aff'g, 824 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Kan. 1993); 824 F.  Supp.
1524 (D. Kan. 1993).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION. The taxpayer had
been receiving assessment of 35 acres of cropland as
agricultural use land eligible for assessment at use value. In
1991, the taxpayer filed an application for agricultural use
valuation but the application was misplaced by the
assessor's office and the land was assessed at full market
value. The taxpayer did not appeal the assessment but
sought correction of the assessment through the Correction
of Errors statute, N.J. Stat. § 54:3-21. The court held that
the statute could be applied only if the removal of the error
would result in a true assessment. Because the error
involved only the misplacement of the application,
additional rulings by the assessor's office and possible
appeals would be required before the correct assessment
could be made; therefore, the correction statute could not be
used. Hovbilt, Inc. v. Township of Howell, 651 A.2d 77
(N.J. 1994).
VETERINARIANS
PRACTICING WITHOUT A LICENSE. The
defendant had been performing examinations and
treatments of horses' mouths for over 9 years without a state
veterinarian's license. The defendant had performed work
on the teeth of one horse which resulted in laceration of the
horse's tongue and the owner filed a complaint with the
state veterinarian licensing board which brought an action
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1,155 for the practice of
veterinary medicine without a license. The defendant
argued that he did not practice veterinary medicine. The
court held that the practice of dentistry on horses was
included in the plain language of the statute. The defendant
also argued that he was eligible for the owner/employee
exception to the licensing requirement which provided that
owners or their employees may treat animals under their
control and possession or as part of an exchange of services.
The court held that the defendant was neither an owner nor
an employee of an owner of the horses and performed the
services in exchange for money; therefore, the defendant
was not eligible for the exception. The defendant also
argued that the licensing statute was unconstitutional, but
the court held that the statute was constitutional as a rational
means of protecting animals and their owners. State v.
Jeffrey, 525 N.W.2d 193 (Neb. 1994).
WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
AGRICULTURAL LABOR EXEMPTION-ALM §
3.05[1].* The plaintiff was an agricultural employee who
was injured while working for the defendant. The defendant
had not waived the exemption for coverage of agricultural
employees; therefore, the plaintiff did not receive any
workers' compensation for the injuries. The plaintiff argued
that the agricultural labor exemption was unconstitutional
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article 1, § 23,
of the Indiana Constitution. The first issue was the standard
to be applied to the exemption. The defendant argued that a
standard used in cases under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution was to be used. The court held that the
federal standard was not to be used under the state
constitution and adopted a two-part standard from case
precedent: first, the special classification or exception must
be based on distinctive, inherent characteristics and the
exception must be based on these characteristics; second,
the exception must be available equally to all persons who
meet the first characteristics. The court held that the
exception for agricultural employees was constitutional
because the plaintiff failed to negate all of the reasonable
bases for the classification and the law applied to all
agricultural employees equally. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d
72 (Ind. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Spencer v. Comm'r, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir.
1995), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-579 (marital deduction),
see p. 29 supra.
